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Scientific progress in measurement theory? 
Abstract  This article is a response to the March, 2013, special issue of the AMS Review, 
which was purportedly about “scientific progress in marketing” but in fact was about 
measurement in marketing.  Even narrower than that, the special issue was about “formative 
measurement” in marketing.  The present article contends that the problems raised by the 
special issue’s authors were solved earlier by Rossiter’s C-OAR-SE measurement theory.  
The main references on C-OAR-SE theory (Rossiter 2002; Bergkvist & Rossiter 2007; 
Rossiter 2011a; Rossiter 2011b) are revisited to explain how continued ignorance of C-OAR-
SE principles has stifled progress in measurement in all the social sciences. 
 
Keywords  Measurement theory · C-OAR-SE approach · Psychometrics approach ·  







 The March 2013 issue of AMS Review was supposed to be about “scientific progress 
in marketing,” the title of the issue’s Editorial written by Crittenden and Peterson (pp. 1-2).  
The articles, however, which amount to a special issue, were actually about social science 
measurement theory.  This is a topic on which the present author literally “wrote the book” 
(see Rossiter 2011a).  The articles focused on the hackneyed topic of “formative” versus 
“reflective” measures.  The lead article on formative vs. reflective measurement was written 
by Lee, Cadogan, and Chamberlain (2013) and the three following articles consisted of 
commentaries by established psychometricians (Howell 2013; Rigdon 2013; and 
Diamantopoulos 2013).  As many readers might be aware, the present author has proposed an 
“anti-psychometrics” approach to measurement that argues for expert-assessed content 
validity as the only requirement for the design and use of a measure.  This theory and its 
associated measure-design procedure – acronymed C-OAR-SE for the six steps involved, 
which are Construct definition, Object classification, Attribute classification, Rater 
identification, Scale formation, and Enumeration and reporting – has often been dismissed as 
being only about “content analysis” or about doing thorough “content checks,” which almost 
every measure designer claims to have done for his or her measure. 
But content validity is far more than this, as explained in my very first publication on 
C-OAR-SE (Rossiter 2002).  In future publications, content validity in the C-OAR-SE sense 
will hereafter be described as construct-to-measure validity, or CtM validity, to emphasize 
the fact that the content of the measure (item or items and answer options) must demonstrate 
very high semantic correspondence with the content of the researcher’s construct definition (a 
definition that must specify the object, attribute, and rater entity in the construct).  The 
semantics of the measure, in its item or items and its answer options, must make sense to the 
rater entity defined in the construct.  The relevant rater entity to whom items and answer 
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options must make sense is the least-educated raters in the case of perceptual constructs and 
the individual expert in the case of psychological constructs (a distinction newly introduced 
in the updated version of C-OAR-SE theory; see Rossiter 2011a).  Perceptual constructs are 
the type most used in the social sciences and their measures must be content-checked, before 
use, by the method of cognitive interviewing (see Rossiter 2002, pp. 320-321).  In no way is 
C-OAR-SE an arbitrary “researcher’s opinion” procedure as some critics have alleged. 
 There are four “key” references in C-OAR-SE theory: first, Rossiter (IJRM, 2002), an 
article cited 960 times according to Google Scholar as of March 2013, the date of the special 
issue, and which in 2012 was acknowledged by receiving IJRM’s Steenkamp Long-Term 
Impact Award; second, Bergkvist and Rossiter (JMR, 2007), cited 506 times, and runner-up 
in 2012 for that journal’s O’Dell Award for 5-Year Impact; third, Rossiter (2011a), the C-
OAR-SE book available from the publisher of AMS Review, Springer, as an e-book and a 
hard-cover book; and fourth, Rossiter (EJM, 2011b), an article invited by Nick Lee (the lead 
author of the main article in the AMS Review special issue) to which he gave the credit of 
being the Outstanding Paper in EJM of that year, and to which several of the special issue’s 
authors – Lee, Cadogan, Howell, and Rigdon – co-signed a rejoinder to in the same issue of 
that journal.  I cannot understand why the special issue’s authors referred to C-OAR-SE 
theory only superficially, if at all.  Lee et al. cited the Rossiter 2002 and 2011b articles but 
not the 2011a book; Howell cited none of them; Rigdon cited the 2002 article and was the 
only author to cite the 2011a book; and another author, Diamantopoulos, cited just one of 
them, the original 2002 article on C-OAR-SE.  Worse, none of the authors acknowledged any 
of the C-OAR-SE principles despite using some of them, unattributed, in their articles.   
 The original C-OAR-SE article (Rossiter 2002) had actually solved all the issues 
raised by the special-issue authors about “formative measurement.”  In that article, I talked 
about abstract formed objects (pp. 312-313), abstract formed attributes (pp. 314-315), index 
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formation from the main components of the object and attribute rather than from a “domain 
sample” of components (p. 315), and the use of weights on the components only if the 
construct definition pre-specifies them (p. 325).  I concluded the section on formed attributes 
– the source of the central dispute in the special issue – with the following quote (p. 315) that 
bears repeating: 
   The theoretical and practical implications of the attribute classification 
decision are major…  Bagozzi (1994, p. 334) says that formative indicators 
(formed attributes) are only “occasionally useful” in marketing measures.  To 
the contrary, formed attributes are probably the prevalent type in marketing 
constructs. 
 
Compare the above 2002 statement from C-OAR-SE theory with what Lee et al. believe to be 
their major insight (2013, p. 11):  “Clarifying which type of variable one is dealing with 
[formative vs. reflective] for all variables in a given model is vitally important…”  Well, this 
is nothing if not (part of) the C-OAR-SE message!  C-OAR-SE however, requires a 
classification rather than a “clarification” and it is a three-fold classification (on each of O, A, 
and R) rather than the single classification (of A) that Lee et al. are proposing. 
The present article is organized under five main headings: 
1. Construct definition 
2. Neglect of the object in the construct 
3. Classification of the attribute in the construct 
4. Identification of the rater entity in the construct 
5. Putting O, A, and R together to form the measure 
6. Borsboom’s concept of “entity realism” 
7. Michell was wrong, too 
Throughout the article, I will provide the C-OAR-SE correctives to all the criticisms I make 
of the special issue authors’ work.  I will adhere to the practice adopted in C-OAR-SE 
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(Rossiter 2002) of denoting construct definitions in ALL CAPS and construct components in 
Upper and Lower Case. 
 
1.  Construct definition 
 Measurement theory in the social sciences is supposed to be about the measurement 
of constructs.  However, the commentating authors in this special issue followed the lead 
authors’ mistaken practice of referring to the measurement of variables.  By “variable” they 
mean only the attribute in the construct, the values of which can vary.  An example of a 
construct discussed by Lee et al., and commentated on by the others, is THE COMPANY’S 
TOTAL ANNUAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE AS VERIFIED BY AN 
INDEPENDENT AUDITOR.  In the construct of THE COMPANY’S TOTAL ANNUAL 
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE AS VERIFIED BY AN INDEPENDENT AUDITOR the 
attribute that can vary, obviously, is the amount of EXPENDITURE expressed in units of 
money – dollars, or euros, or pounds, or whatever the currency may be.   
 This last example leads into the major point that I want to make here, which is that all 
measurement in the social sciences must begin with a full construct definition.  Construct 
definition is what the “C” stands for in the C-OAR-SE acronym.  According to C-OAR-SE 
theory, a construct must be defined in terms of three elements: (1) the object to be judged, (2) 
the attribute in terms of which it is to be judged, and (3) the rater entity who is providing the 
judgments.  In the construct of THE COMPANY’S TOTAL ANNUAL ADVERTISING 
EXPENDITURE AS VERIFIED BY AN INDEPENDENT AUDITOR, the object is THE 
COMPANY’S TOTAL ANNUAL ADVERTISING; the attribute is EXPENDITURE (in 
units of Money or alternatively UNITS OF Gross Rating Points, as the marketing authors Lee 
et al. should know); and the rater entity is, or should be, in this case, an EXPERT AUDITOR, 
such as one of the various industry media-auditing bodies. 
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As I have pointed out many times before (e.g., Rossiter 2002, 2011a, 2011b), social 
science theorists inevitably refer only to the attribute in the construct.  For example, Lee et al. 
(2013) label the other constructs they discuss in their article simply (and simplistically) as 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS; ROLE AMBIGUITY; and PERCEIVED COERCIVE 
POWER.  They, like the commentating authors, fail to specify what the object is in these 
constructs (whose socioeconomic status? what role? and who exactly wields the coercive 
power?).  They also fail to specify the rater entity in each construct (the EXPERT AUDITOR 
for advertising expenditure; the SOCIOLOGIST EXPERT for assessing the resource value of 
various occupations in forming SES assignments of households (see below); the 
EMPLOYEE in job-role ambiguity; and the BUYERS FROM A SPECIFIC SUPPLIER for 
rating the supplier’s perceived coercive power).  A good example of rater-entity neglect was 
Lee et al.’s (2013) struggle with the construct of THE BUYER’S PERCEPTION OF THE 
SUPPLIER’S COERCIVE POWER; they had to define this construct differently, as 
ACCESS TO COERCIVE TOOLS, when the rater entity – or “unit of analysis” as they 
termed the rater entity – shifted from the BUYER to the SUPPLIER (see their Table 1 on p. 
10).  Here, Lee et al. were merely rediscovering the C-OAR-SE formula for construct 
definition. 
Neglect of the object and neglect of the rater entity are the two  most common 
mistakes in measure design and they make up my next two criticisms. 
 
2.  Neglect of the object in the construct 
  The authors in the special issue fail to realize that a construct can be formed over its 
sub-objects, if any, as well as over its sub-attributes, if any.  I say “if any” in both cases 
because the object in the construct may be singular and unambiguous and thus “concrete” and 
so, too, the attribute may be “concrete.”  This led to my concept of “doubly concrete” 
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constructs – of which BELIEFS are the prime example – which require only a highly content-
valid single-item measure (see especially Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007).   
 In the original C-OAR-SE article (Rossiter 2002), I proposed that the object of the 
construct could be classified either as “concrete,” as “abstract collective,” or as “abstract 
formed.”  In the construct of TOTAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE – and I will use Lee 
et al.’s inadequate short label here purely for convenience – the object, THE COMPANY’S 
TOTAL ANNUAL ADVERTISING, is abstract collective, consisting of the sub-objects TV 
Advertising, Newspaper Advertising, and so forth, across all media in which THE 
COMPANY places its advertising.  The expenditure on each of these sub-objects is 
“collected together” and added up in the measure.  This is because the term “TOTAL 
ADVERTISING” is ambiguous and therefore abstract unless its sub-objects are specified.  
The sub-objects themselves – TV Advertising, Newspaper Advertising, etc. – are concrete, as 
there should be no ambiguity about these. 
 There are also sub-objects in the short-named, economist-originated, construct of 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS.  The attribute in the SES construct is actually RESOURCES 
– an abstract formed attribute that is supposed to represent both monetary and intellectual 
resources (see Rossiter 2012).  In contrast, in the sociologically originated construct of A 
HOUSEHOLD’S SOCIAL CLASS AS ESTIMATED BY AN EXPERT INTERVIEWER 
(see W. Lloyd Warner’s pioneering work in Social Class in America and see the excellent 
account of SOCIAL CLASS conceptualization and measurement by Coleman 1983), the 
attribute is SOCIAL PRESTIGE.  The object of the SES construct, too, is clearly abstract 
formed.  The researcher forms the SES object by defining it in terms of selected sub-objects.  
For example, Hollingshead’s early SES index combined Occupation Rank (of, in those days, 
the male head of household’s occupation) and Education Level (again only of the male 
household head).  It was only later that Income Level (usually the pre-tax income of all 
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household members combined) was added to SES indexes.  Modern SES indexes also take 
into account the partner’s occupation ranking and education level, when a partner is present 
(see Coleman 1983; Rossiter 2012).  The SES object is therefore arbitrarily formed by the 
researcher’s arbitrary (and, generously, theoretical) selection of demographic indicators as 
sub-objects.  Ironically enough, just as C-OAR-SE has been placed by many in the “too-hard 
basket,” so too have multiple-demographic measures of SES.  As revealed in Rossiter (2012, 
p. 90), the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.K. government, and the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
now use only one component, or “indicator” – Occupational Status Ranking – to measure 
SES. 
 The construct of THE BUYER’S PERCEPTION OF THE SUPPLIER’S COERCIVE 
POWER provides another example of a construct with an abstract formed object.  In the 
examples in Lee et al.’s Table 1 on p. 10, the researchers arbitrarily chose the sub-objects that 
arguably represent the supplier’s acts of coercion – Delaying Delivery, Delaying Warranty 
Claims, Charging High Prices, and so on.  These multiple items also incorporate their own 
sub-attributes – Delay, Overcharging, and the like – which all get at the overall attribute of 
COERCION.  The PERCEIVED COERCIVE POWER construct (again to use its short label) 
is therefore doubly formed: it is formed over the selected sub-objects (the chosen acts) and 
over the chosen sub-attributes (representing coercion).  Marketing theorists should also 
realize that the famous SERVQUAL measure also represents a doubly formed construct: the 
sub-objects are the service provider’s Physical Retail Facilities, and the Service Personnel, 
primarily, whereas the sub-attributes variously paired with these sub-objects are such things 
as Appearance, Politeness, Empathy, and Response Time.  For these reasons, the present 
author referred to the construct that SERVQUAL is supposed to measure as 
COMPONENTIAL SERVICE QUALITY AS PERCEIVED BY CUSTOMERS VS. 
POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS.  He designed a C-OAR-SE-based measure of componential 
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service quality in e-retailing called ER-SERVCOMPQUAL (see Rossiter 2009).  
Management theorists such as Diamantopoulos (an author in this special issue) should also 
realize that one of his invented constructs, EXPORT COORDINATION AS PERCEIVED 
BY DEPARTMENTAL MANAGERS IN AN EXPORT FIRM, is also doubly formed (see 
Rossiter 2008). 
 Such important subtleties in construct definition have been missed by social 
psychologists, as well.  The sole exception to this indictment seems to be for the intercultural 
construct of INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM.  Brewer and Chen (2007) asked the 
pertinent question in the title of their paper: “Where (who) are collectives in collectivism?”  
From a content analysis of I-C measures, they found that the nature of the COLLECTIVE 
REFERENCE GROUP was in fact various – sometimes Family, sometimes Close Friends, 
sometimes Work Colleagues, sometimes the individual’s Nation at Large, and at other times 
not even specified (e.g., “It is important to maintain harmony within my group”).  These are, 
of course, sub-objects and their haphazard identification in questionnaire measures of I-C 
raises the question of just what people are supposed to be “collective” toward.  The 
COLLECTIVE as an overall object, in C-OAR-SE terminology, is abstract formed because 
the researcher has to decide what the main sub-objects are; it is not, as might first appear, 
abstract collective, simply because the population of COLLECTIVES is ill-defined and 
almost unbounded.  The attribute in the INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM construct is 
also conceptually interesting.  My reference to collectives as reference groups suggests that 
the attribute is simple and concrete, namely, IDENTIFICATION WITH.  However, Brewer 
and Chen’s (2007) content analysis of the measures of I-C suggests that researchers have 
conceptualized the attribute as abstract (and formed) and consisting of sub-attributes such as 
Agency, Felt Obligation, and Norm Following (called “Responsiveness to others’ needs” by 
those authors; see p. 141).  According to Brewer and Chen’s construct definition, therefore, 
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THE INDIVIDUAL’S STANDING ON THE INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM TRAIT 
would be classified as what I have called (in the Rossiter 2011a book) a FORMOB-
ABACHD-INDRAT construct in which the object is formed, the attribute is also formed or 
what I now describe as achieved (with this renaming undertaken precisely to get out of the 
silly “formative” versus “reflective” debate), and the rater entity is the individual (who 
performs a self-rating on the component items of the measure).  This nicely illustrates the 
three-fold classification of construct elements that has to be made in the C-OAR-SE 
approach. 
 This advanced type of “content analysis” is difficult and is doubtless the main reason 
why researchers have not adopted the C-OAR-SE method of measure design.  You actually 
have to think, up front, to define the construct and to classify its object, attribute, and rater 
entity.  Why classify?  Because the measure types differ.  Measure types will be discussed in 
section 5. 
 
3.  Classification of the attribute in the construct 
 In the original C-OAR-SE article was a footnote that everyone, including the authors 
in the special issue of AMS Review, has ignored (Rossiter 2002, p. 314, note 6).  This note 
explains why the term “formative indicators” should not be used and why the term formed 
attribute should be used instead.  Because of its obvious importance to the present article, I 
reproduce this note in full:  
   The description “formative attribute” is not correct because it suggests that 
it is the attribute that is doing the forming rather than, correctly, that it is the 
items that are doing so.  For the opposite reason, the earlier terms “cause 
indicators” (Blalock, 1964), or “formative indicators” (Fornell & Bookstein, 
1982), are not suitable because they refer to the items rather than to the 
resulting attribute.  Also, describing both types of items as “indicators” is 
confusing because in the case of formed attributes, and abstract formed 
objects, the items are defining, not merely indicants.  In C-OAR-SE, the 
indicator description of items is applicable only for attributes that are 
classified as eliciting. 
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 The last word, “eliciting,” is my term for what others would call a “reflective” 
attribute.  This term clarifies the mistake made by Blalock (1964) and later Bollen and 
Lennox (1991) in referring to “cause indicators” versus “effect indicators,” when a much 
better case could be made for reversing these descriptions.  Specifically, the sub-attributes of 
a formed attribute do not cause the overall attribute other than in the trivial sense of causing 
an arithmetic sum score to be produced.  On the other hand, an eliciting attribute is a cause in 
that it literally causes the sub-attributes, so that these sub-attributes are actually “indicators of 
the cause” not “indicators of the effect(s)” as Blalock’s original description implies.  To avoid 
this conceptual (and semantic) confusion, the term “formed attribute” in the 2002 version of 
C-OAR-SE was replaced in the 2011 version by the term achieved attribute, and the term 
“eliciting attribute” was replaced by the term dispositional attribute.  I still like the term 
“eliciting” because this is exactly what a dispositional attribute does; for example, Spearman’s 
generalized intelligence attribute, g, elicits scores on a test of general intelligence.  Moreover, 
and here I’m going to fire a shot at those such as Lee et al. who tried to understand 
MacCorquodale and Meehl’s famous 1948 article without understanding learning theory, g is 
hypothesized to do this in Hull’s innate, or unlearned, stimulus-response connection, or SUR, 
sense. 
I wish to remind readers (and the special issue’s authors) that there was always a third 
classification of attribute in C-OAR-SE theory – the concrete attribute.  Only abstract (multi-
meaning) attributes can be “achieved” or “dispositional,” or “formed” versus “reflective” if 
you prefer the older terminology.  In the 2011a book version of C-OAR-SE theory, I 
subdivided concrete attributes into two further classifications called “perceptual” and 
“psychological,” respectively.  I shall take up this distinction in section 5 (on putting the 




4.  Identification of the rater entity in the construct 
 In C-OAR-SE theory I have always maintained that the construct must be defined in 
terms of its object, its attribute, and its rater entity.  In the 2002 original C-OAR-SE theory 
there were three possible types of rater entity – the Individual rater, the Expert rater, and the 
Group rater; and in the 2011a version Expert raters were subdivided into Substantive Experts 
and “trained experts” called Coders, and group raters were also subdivided into Manager 
Groups and Consumer Groups. 
In the construct of SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (to again use the short label), the 
rater entity is the CODER, who must code the Occupation Descriptions, Educational 
Qualifications, and Reported Income into status-reflecting (actually resource-reflecting) 
levels.  In the quite different construct of SOCIAL CLASS (again to employ the short label), 
the rater entity should be the EXPERT SOCIOLOGIST INTERVIEWER – see especially 
discussion of this by Coleman (1983).  The expert sociologist interviewer makes an extended 
visit to the individual’s home to interview the head or heads of household to establish the full 
nature of their occupation (and seniority of job position held), the quality of their education 
(giving higher scores for private schooling and top-line universities, for example), and the 
source of their income (giving higher scores to inheritance and investments as the primary 
source of income); and also judging the prestige value of all of the following – the home 
itself, its residential area, motor vehicles, furniture and furnishings, collected art objects and 
art-going interests, and even the adult occupants’ choice of formal and casual clothing for 
themselves and for their children, if any.  It is little wonder that economists, marketers, and 
sociologists alike turn to the easy but much less accurate route of demographic indicators! 
In Lee et al.’s short-named construct of ROLE AMBIGUITY, the rater entity is most 
evidently the INDIVIDUAL (or SELF); this individual could be an EMPLOYEE if the role of 
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theoretical interest is a JOB ROLE or, say, a PARENT if the role of interest is the 
PARENTAL ROLE (a topic of fierce debate now with same-sex marriages). 
I have already discussed the rater entity for the short-named construct of TOTAL 
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE but I now wish to reinforce and expand upon 
Diamantopoulos’s (2013, p. 34) observation about PERCEIVED ADVERTISING 
EXPENDITURE, which is an entirely different construct because of the rater entity.  
Companies have long followed the practice of publicly overstating their total advertising 
budgets, or these days “marketing communications” budgets, to deter their competitors in the 
industry (in my outside work as an advertising consultant, many of my clients have privately 
admitted to engaging in this practice because “everyone does it”).  This means that 
PERCEIVED ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE AS PERCEIVED BY COMPETITORS’ 
MANAGERS is a very real perceptual construct that differs from the objectively rated 
construct of TOTAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE.  A second different construct was 
proposed by Ambler and Hollier (2005) in a thoughtful article in the Journal of Advertising 
Research.  Their theory is that when the rater entity – although they didn’t use that term – is 
the PROSPECTIVE CUSTOMER or the POTENTIAL CONSUMER-BUYER, then THE 
BRAND’S PERCEIVED ADVERTISING VISIBILITY serves as a signal, or “surrogate 
indicator,” of THE BRAND’S QUALITY.  These observations go to show, as 
Diamantopoulos suspected, that so-called TOTAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE is a 
meaningless construct unless its object (whose advertising expenditure?), its attribute 
(objectively money or subjectively a perception), and its rater entity (see above) are identified 
and named in the construct definition. 
 I will give just one example of the importance of specifying the rater entity in the 
construct definition in the field of social psychology.  This is the example of the construct of 
PERSONALITY TRAITS.  H.J. Eysenck’s well-known biologically-based personality traits 
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of EXTRAVERSION-INTROVERSION, NEUROTICISM, and PSYCHOTICISM require an 
EXPERT PSYCHOLOGIST as the rater entity.  In contrast, the so-called Big Five personality 
traits of OPENNESS, CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, EXTRAVERSION, AGREEABLENESS, 
and NEUROTICISM (forming the OCEAN acronym) require only the INDIVIDUAL as the 
rater entity; this is because the OCEANs are not personality traits at all but rather are person-
perception characteristics (see Rossiter 2011a).  The INDIVIDUAL rater entity can either be 
the SELF, as in self-rated “personality,” or an OTHER, as when someone else, such as a 
friend, a teacher, or an employer makes these judgments about your “personality.”  
 
5.  Putting O, A, and R together to form the measure 
 In fact, all measures of social science constructs are formed.  Single-item measures are 
formed by combining an object part with an attribute part (see Rossiter 2002, pp. 319-320).  
Multiple-item measures are formed aggregations of single-item measures (see Rossiter and 
Bergkvist 2009) and are therefore, in effect, formed twice over (at the item level and then at 
the “scale” level).  The rater entity specified in the construct does not appear directly in the 
measure.  However, it too forms every item indirectly.  The rater entity’s presence is 
represented by wording the item, or items – and the answer options – to be perfectly 
understood by the rater entity.   
 C-OAR-SE theory is unique in proposing that measure design depends directly on the 
prior classification, by the researcher, of the object and the attribute in the construct.  In 
Rossiter 2011a, rules for item design and total measure design were spelled out for the very 
first time in the social science literature (whereas they were only implicit in the 2002 article).  
These are repeated (in slightly improved form) in Table 1 for the benefit of those who haven’t 





Table 1 about here 
 
 Application of C-OAR-SE measure-design principles requires the researcher to fully 
define the to-be-measured construct in terms of its object and attribute, and then to classify the 
object and the attribute.  Failure to do both was the problem throughout Lee et al.’s article.  
For example, as pointed out earlier, TOTAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE should have 
been fully defined as THE COMPANY’S TOTAL ANNUAL ADVERTISING (the object) 
EXPRESSED IN DOLLARS OF EXPENDITURE (the attribute) AS ESTIMATED BY AN 
INDEPENDENT AUDITOR (the rater entity).  It would then be seen that the object is 
abstract collective – requiring in this case a census, not a sample, of all the media that the 
company spends advertising money in, as sub-objects.  The attribute is concrete (concrete 
perceptual) and thus requires only a single attribute item-part for the various media types, 
namely, dollars.  What was loosely described as TOTAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 
now becomes a COLLOB-CONCPERC-EXPRAT construct in C-OAR-SE (2011a) terms.  
The overall measure of it is formed over the sub-objects, and the items are formed by the 
respective concrete sub-object paired with the common concrete attribute of money. 
 It might be worth examining once again another of Lee et al.’s constructs, 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, or SES, because this was the example of “formative 
measurement” used by Bollen and Lennox (1991) and later by Borsboom (2005), 
measurement theorists whom Lee et al. (2013) cite and admire.  As explained earlier, SES is  
considered by modern economists to be a measure of RESOURCES (the attribute) available 
to a HOUSEHOLD (the object) as estimated indirectly (by an expert rater entity) from the 
HEAD(S) OF HOUSEHOLD’S DEMOGRAPHICS.  The Australian government, for 
example, allocates funding to schools in inverse proportion to the average SES of the 
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households located in the school’s drawing area (usually a postcode).  The expert coder, 
knowingly or not, is assigning “SES points” according to occupation status, education level 
achieved, and total income bracket on the basis of the economic resources – a.k.a. in 
newspeak “social capital” – that each demographic attainment level usually brings.  However, 
the attribute of RESOURCES is entirely fuzzy or, in other words, abstract, because it gets 
into the politically sensitive issue of the intellectual resource advantages that might be 
involved.  It is undoubtedly the difficulty of making the resource inferences from 
demographic levels that has led economists in some countries, as noted earlier, to fall back on 
one indicator – Occupation Status Rank – for the measure (occupation status, note, which 
excludes “millionaire tradesmen,” would-be “gangsters,” and similar “black money” high 
earners, and does indicate intellectual resources – general intelligence and usually better 
education – as much as financial resources).  The multiple-demographic construct of SES 
would be classified as COLLOB-ABACHD-EXPRAT, with the two measure-design rules 
(see again Table 1) of a multiple-item census of sub-objects (household adults’ multiple 
demographic reports) and one good item part for each of the sub-attributes (measuring the 
respective inferences of the amount of “resources” attributable to the level of each 
demographic sub-object).  Anyone having to design a measure of SES for a serious (rather 
than academic) purpose would realize these design rules intuitively. 
 Complex?  You bet!  Complicated?  Necessarily!  Scientific progress?  Yes, 
undeniably.  I will conclude with comments on a couple of other measurement theorists’ work 
which also does not represent progress. 
 
6.  Borsboom’s concept of “entity realism” 
 C-OAR-SE was originally described as a “rationalist” approach to measurement as 
contrasted with the “empiricist” approach of the psychometricians (Rossiter 2002, p. 308).  
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This distinction is demonstrated by my insistence on a priori construct-to-measure (CtM) 
validity as the only requirement of a measure, whereas psychometricians attempt to “validate” 
the measure by seeing, afterwards, how well it performs empirically in terms of its score’s 
statistics – factor loadings of item scores, coefficient alpha, and so forth.  My rationalist 
position was also clearly explained in my 2011b EJM article (on pp. 1562 and 1565).  In my 
2011a book (in the preface and in the introductory chapter), I described what Borsboom and 
Lee et al. would call my “ontological stance” as rational realism.  I even told the non-
apocryphal story (on p. vii) about my listening to country music when I want to “get real,” 
and I could have added that this is most often when I’ve read some study or other that 
employs psychometrics! 
More seriously, I made a detailed argument against “latent constructs” on the grounds 
that they are not real.  I argued that the latent constructs proposed by most social scientists are 
artificial – and artifactual – entities mostly derived from blind reliance on factor analysis and 
blind adherence to the psychometric tradition.  In other words, these latent constructs do not 
exist – either in theory or in the mind of the rater entity.  Real but non self-reportable 
constructs I called (Rossiter 2011a) psychological constructs and gave as prime examples 
Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic constructs of REPRESSION, PROJECTION, 
SUBLIMATION, and the OEDIPUS COMPLEX and ELECTRA COMPLEX (and see 
Westen’s 1988 contention that most of Freud’s constructs have been inadvertently reified and 
relabeled in modern cognitive psychology, and that they still exist in the researcher’s mind 
though with new labels).  Real self-reportable constructs I called perceptual constructs and 
these include ubiquitous social science constructs such as BELIEFS, OVERALL ATTITUDE, 
and VALUES, which must exist in the rater entity’s mind in order for the individual to 
function.  I would argue that “latent constructs” such as INDIVIDUALISM-
COLLECTIVISM, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (as opposed to SOCIAL PRESTIGE), 
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ROLE AMBIGUITY, and PERCEIVED COERCIVE POWER do not exist in any functional 
sense.  In the real world, people do not go around thinking to themselves, for example, that “I 
am a collectivist” or “My socioeconomic status is high” or “My job is ambiguous” or “Gee, 
that supplier has a lot of coercive power!”  Rather, people function according to concrete 
beliefs, actual felt emotions, vocally if privately expressed specific values, real (but 
sometimes unrecognized or unadmitted) motives, and the like.  These mental constructs 
unarguably exist because, otherwise, individual differences in responses to the same stimulus 
could not be accounted for.  This fact is well represented in the S-O-R theories that long ago 
overtook Watsonian S-R theories in the social sciences.  In the Hull-Spence Behavior Theory 
that I personally favor (see Foxall and Rossiter 2008; Rossiter and Percy 1997) these 
undoubtedly existing constructs are represented in the individual by learned connections, such 
as SVR for stimulus-object awareness, SHR for overall attitude, and SKR for incentive 
motivation.  And you might want to closely read MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) for a 
complex discussion of this point. 
 As Lee et al. (2013, p. 5) note, Borsboom rules out “formative measurement” and thus 
dismisses formed constructs.  Borsboom (2005; also Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van 
Heerden 2004) argues that for a construct to be valid (a) it must exist as an independent entity 
– a condition with which I obviously agree, as argued above; and (b) the construct must cause 
the scores on the measure of it.  This second condition appears to allow only “reflective” or 
dispositional attributes but in fact must apply to concrete attributes as well (e.g., when a 
specific and doubly concrete learned attitude in the rater’s mind causes the rating level that he 
or she endorses on an attitude scale).  Borsboom’s second condition appears to dismiss formed 
constructs (remembering that such constructs can be formed by virtue of having sub-objects 
or sub-attributes or both).  His argument, echoed by others in the special issue including Lee 
et al., is that the formed construct does not exist independently of its components (the sub-
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objects or the sub-attributes).  This is true, but only because the components form an abstract 
construct rather than a functional construct, which must be concrete.  However, we certainly 
can measure an abstract construct and we do so all the time (measuring a company’s TOTAL 
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE being just one example).  As I stated in a C-OAR-SE 
article earlier (Rossiter 2005), the exclusion of formed constructs would eliminate most of the 
major constructs in the social sciences.  Excluded constructs would include 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS in economics (formed over demographic attributes), 
CONSERVATISM in social psychology (formed over attitude objects), the SELF-CONCEPT 
in individual psychology (formed over attributes such as self-esteem and self-efficacy), 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION in management, and SERVICE QUALITY in 
marketing (both of which are doubly formed over sub-objects and their sub-attributes).  
Regardless of whether or not these abstract constructs are “researchers’ fictions,” they can be 
measured.  One cannot rule out formed constructs, as Borsboom does, as not being 
“measurement.”   
What has not been realized is the change in C-OAR-SE theory that I stated plainly in 
the Abstract in my 2011b EJM article (which Borsboom and some of the present authors 
commented on) and also on pp. 54-56 of my 2011a book (which Rigdon, at least, claimed to 
have read).  The updated version of C-OAR-SE theory now rejects the “reflective” 
measurement approach.  Specifically, I argued in the C-OAR-SE update that all abstract 
attributes are formed from a measure-design standpoint.  This is because the sum scores on 
even a reflective attribute are completely dependent on the scores obtained from the particular 
items chosen to make up the measure.  For instance, total scores on the NEUROTICISM 
personality trait are formed by, and depend entirely on, the set of items included in the 
multiple-item measure and these sets are many and various (see Rossiter 2011a, pp. 54-56).  
Various – and variable – item selection is widely practiced when researchers design reflective 
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measures using factor analysis or when they shorten others’ measures for convenience.  The 
designed or shortened measure depends totally on the component items selected; in other 
words, the measure is formed by them.  (Reflective or what I call eliciting attributes – 
dispositions – must functionally exist and they can be shown to exist in the brain as a set of 
innate or learned S-R connections.  Far too many researchers invent dispositions as mere 
descriptions of the Rs; see especially B.F. Skinner, 1959, for this well-known criticism.) 
But back to Borsboom.  The realization that so-called reflective constructs also do not 
exist independently of the items chosen to measure them, coupled with the fact that he does 
not even grant the existence of doubly concrete constructs, means that Borsboom would rule 
out all measures!   
 
7.  Michell was wrong, too 
 Ruling out all measures in the social sciences is essentially what the University of 
Sydney psychologist, Joel Michell, has done.  One of the special issue authors (Rigdon 2013, 
pp. 27-28) drags in Michell’s old (1986) argument, which is basically that measures that 
deliver anything less than ratio-scaled numerical answers – as 99% do in the social sciences – 
are not measures at all.  In Michell’s view, nominal (categorical) and ordinal (rank order) 
measures are not acceptable, although he makes a clever case for equal-interval measures as 
being able to produce ratio results.  Rigdon then uses this questionable argument, citing 
Michell (2009), to reject C-OAR-SE theory because its classifications of objects, attributes, 
and rater entities are only categorical.  That is true, but this line of argument would rule out 
clinical diagnoses in psychiatry as not measuring anything valid because the diagnoses are 
categorical; it would rule out all typologies in psychology and management because each type 
is a category; and it would rule out customer segments in marketing since these, too, are 
categorical.  This line of argument also would rule out factor analysis in all fields because it 
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groups items in R-factor analysis, or individuals in Q-factor analysis, into categories.  
Categorical measurement is still measurement and to argue otherwise is to pursue a very 
strange and constricted view of measurement.  And if Rigdon wants to further endorse 
Michell’s position by rejecting ordinal measurement, he might want to consider the much-
ignored argument made by Norman Cliff (made most recently in Cliff and Keats’ 2003 book) 
that all quantitative measures in the social sciences need to be no more than ordinal and, what 
is more, that our favored statistical routines, including factor analysis, do not require anything 
more than ordinal measures.  Michell takes an excessively quantitative (and unrealistic) 
position with regard to social science measurement. 
 Rigdon does not actually empathize with Michell’s nihilistic prognosis.  Rigdon’s 
final paragraph begins with the following: “Could it really be that bad?  Could there really be 
decades of research with nothing to show for it?” (p. 28).  My answer is: “Yes, it is that bad.”  
In my major theoretical publications on C-OAR-SE, from the first (Rossiter 2002) to the last 
(Rossiter 2011a, 2011b), I contended that inattention beforehand to what I now call construct-
to-measure validity and unthinking adherence to the psychometric practice of attempting to 
validate measures after the fact by looking at the scores they produce renders all findings 
suspect in the social sciences since about 1950, when the psychometric “true-score plus error” 
notion took over. 
 
Conclusion 
To return to the “scientific progress” theme of the AMS Review special issue, it is the 
neglect of the C-OAR-SE theory of measure design that has hindered progress in the social 
sciences.  We will not make any progress until our measures are properly designed.  To put it 
coarsely, progress will require the abortion of psychometrics and the adoption of C-OAR-SE.  
That there is still a debate in the AMS Review about “formative” versus “reflective” 
23 
 
measurement when all constructs necessarily have formed measures typifies the backward-
looking stance taken by those who ignore C-OAR-SE. 
In the interest of encouraging researchers to read more about C-OAR-SE theory and 
how to apply it, I have listed all 23 C-OAR-SE-based references separately from the main 
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     Concrete Iconic representation of object 
 
     Abstract collective Census or, if many, a representative sample of 
constituent sub-objects 
 







     Concrete perceptual One good rater-derived description of the attribute 
 
     Concrete psychological One good researcher-chosen description of the attribute 
 
     Abstract achieved One concrete item for each first-order sub-attribute 
 




Note:  Each first-order item (the items on the questionnaire) must be doubly concrete; that is, 
it must have a concrete object part paired with a concrete attribute part. 
 
